In an authentication process, the originator of the communication and the respondent transact some identification codes to each other, prior to start of the message transaction. Several methods have been proposed regarding the authentication process for computer communication and smart card based networks from time to time. We introduced a new scheme to enhance and ensure the remote authentication through secure and dynamic authentication using a smart card, which is relatively a different approach.
II. RELATED WORKS
The researchers and academicians have proposed Numbers of research ideas about the remote authentication schemes from time to time. A password authentication scheme with the insecure communication channel was proposed by [1] in 1981. A remote password authentication scheme based on ElGamal's signature scheme was analyzed by [2] in 1994. Password authentication schemes with smart cards was analyzed by [3] in 1999. A new remote user authentication scheme using smart cards was proposed by [4] in 2000. The Cryptanalysis of a remote user authentication scheme using Smart cards was analyzed by [5] in 2000. Examining smart card security under the threat of power analysis attacks was analyzed by [6] in 2002. A remote authentication scheme using smart cards with forward secrecy was analyzed by [7] in 2003. A modified remote user authentication scheme using smart cards was analyzed by [8] in 2003 . The Cryptanalysis of a modified remote user authentication scheme using smart cards was discussed by [9] in 2003. A New remote user authentication scheme with smart cards was suggested by [10] in 2004. An Efficient remote user authentication scheme based on the generalized ElGamal signature scheme was proposed by [11] in 2004. The Cryptanalysis of security enhancement for the timestamp-based password authentication scheme using smart cards was discussed by [12] in 2004. An Efficient password authenticated key agreement using smart card was proposed by [13] in 2004 .
The Man-in-the-middle attack on the authentication of the user from the remote autonomous object was analyzed by [14] in 2005. A password authentication scheme over insecure Networks was analyzed by [15] in 2006. The Cryptanalysis of two improved password authentication schemes using smart cards was discussed by [16] in 2006. A novel remote user authentication scheme using bilinear pairings was suggested by [17] in 2006. A Remote password authentication scheme with smart cards and biometrics was analyzed by [18] in 2006. An efficient and complete remote user authentication scheme using smart cards was proposed by [19] in 2006. A forward secure user authentication scheme with Smart Cards was analyzed by [20] in 2006. An improved efficient remote user authentication scheme was proposed by [21] in 2007. The Two-factor mutual authentication based on smart cards and passwords was analyzed by [22] in 2008. A more efficient and secure dynamic IDbased remote user authentication scheme was proposed by [23] 
in 2009.
A Variant-based Biometric Authentication Scheme Based on Rotor Machine for Home Security was analyzed by [24] in 2009 to avoid the fingerprint template stolen and to immune network attacks for smart home applications through security, in which the user encrypts and alters the biometric template arbitrarily.
A Multifactor Hash Digest Challenge-Response Authentication Scheme for Session Initiation Protocol was proposed by [25] in 2010. A New Secure Remote User Authentication Scheme with Smart Cards was proposed by [26] in 2010 to overcome flaws and to provide essential security requirements.
A Secure Dynamic Authentication Scheme for Smart Card based Networks was proposed by [27] in 2010 to overcome the possible network security threats and to ensure the authentication, confidentiality, reliability, integrity, and security using dynamic authentication scheme.
III. PROPOSED DYNAMIC MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
A secure dynamic authentication scheme is a new method of remote user authentication and server authentication scheme for smart card based network systems, which is introduced for enhancing the authentication, and security features in existing smart card based applications in network communications. The notations used in this authentication scheme are shown in Table- 1. This authentication scheme consists of phases namely Registration phase, Login phase, and Dynamic Mutual Authentication phase. These phases are discussed as follows:
A. Registration Phase
In this phase, the user registers with the remote server based on the manual account created details, when a new account is to be created for electronic networked communications are required. At the time of registration, the user account is created and the user identity is determined by the authentication server and it is stored in the smart card memory. In this scheme, the authentication server maintains the User Identity will vary for each successful login phase. Whenever, the user registers to create a new account for electronic transactions, the above said factors and their values are intimated to the user by the server immediately after the successful registration phase. The user will have to use these factors during the login phase and dynamic mutual authentication phase. The steps of transaction between the User and the remote Authentication Server are discussed as follows:
Step 1: The user places the Registration Request to the Authentication Server of a Bank with the details namely User Name (U N ), User Account Number (N AC ), Type of Account (T AC ), and the Bank Code (B C ) as:
Step 2 . User Name (U N ) is a string of characters, which are converted into ASCII codes (C C ) of each character and all these character codes are EX-ORed with one another to generate the User name code (U NC ) which is given as:
Step 3 
Step 
B. Login Phase
In this phase, the User logon with the remote Authentication Server through the Smart Card Reader (SCR) system. When the user inserts the smart card into the card reader machine, the machine asks the user to enter the User Identity (U ID ) code. The user enters the U ID into the card reader machine using smart card. Then the machine compares the entered U ID and the available U ID from the database. If both the identity values do not match, then the card reader machine rejects the login request of the user. Else, the card reader machine redirects the control to the authentication server by sending the correct user identity U ID. The authentication server takes over the control for further steps of authentication between the 
C. Dynamic Mutual Authentication Phase
In this phase, the server verifies for the genuine user and in turn, the user verifies the genuine authentication server. The server verifies the user identity sent by the smart card reader system and if both the values do not match, then the server rejects the authentication request. Else, the authentication steps between the authentication server and the user are given as follows:
Step 1: The server generates the server tokens as (t1, t2, t3, t4) and sends them to the user using Diffie-Hellman key exchange method DH( ) to determine the secret keys (sk1, sk2, sk3, sk4) respectively, by the user using the same DH( ) method. In turn, the user generates user tokens as (t5, t6, t7, t8) and sends them to the server using DH( ) method to determine the secret keys (sk1, sk2, sk3, sk4) respectively, by the server using the same DH( ) method.
Step 2: The server determines the secret key sk1, computes the component hf(N AC  sk1), and sends this component to the user. In addition, the server asks the user to enter the Temporary Password Index (T PWI ) initially. From next authentication phase, the server asks the user to enter User new Password Index (U PWI ).
Step 3: The user verifies the received Account Number (N AC ) with the computed Account Number (N AC ) using sk1 and if both the values do not match, then the user rejects this step and stops further steps of authentication. Else, the user computes the component hf(T PWI  sk1), and sends it to the server.
Step 4: The server verifies the received Temporary Password Index (T PWI ) initially, and User new Password Index (U PWI ) from next authentication phase, with the computed Temporary Password Index (T PWI ) initially, and User Password Index (U PWI ) from next authentication phase using the secret key sk1, and if both the values do not match, then the server rejects this step and stops further steps of authentication. Else, the server determines secret key sk2, computes the component hf(U N  sk2), and sends it to the user. In addition, the server asks the user to enter the Temporary Password (T PW ) initially, and User new Password (U PW ) from next authentication phase.
Step 5: The user verifies the received User Name (U N ) with the computed User Name (U N ) using the secret key sk2, and if both the names do not match, then the user rejects this step and stops further steps of authentication. Else, the user computes the component hf(U PW  sk2), and sends it to the server.
Step 6: The server verifies the received User Password (U PW ) with the computed User Password (U PW ) using the secret key sk2, and if both the passwords do not match, then the server rejects this step and stops further steps of authentication. Else, the server determines the secret key sk3, computes the component hf(D M  sk3), and sends it to the user. In addition, the server asks the user to enter the New Password Index (N PWI ).
Step 7: The user verifies the received Date of Modification (DM) with the computed (DM) using the secret key sk3, and if both the dates do not match, then the user rejects this step and stops further steps of authentication. Else, the user computes the Encrypted component E(N PWI  sk3), and sends it to the server.
Step 8: The server decrypts and determines the New Password Index (N PWI ) using the secret key sk3, stores the New Password Index (N PWI ) in its database, determines secret key sk4, computes the component hf(B C  sk4), and sends it to the user. In addition, the server asks the user to enter the New Password (N PW ).
Step 9: The user verifies the received Bank Code (B C ) with the computed (B C ) using the secret key sk4, and if both the codes do not match, then the user rejects this step, and stops further steps of authentication. Else, the user computes the Encrypted component E(N PW  sk4), and sends it to the server.
Step 10: The server decrypts and determines the New Password (N PW ) using the secret key sk4, and stores the New Password (N PW ) in its database.
The above steps of authentication between the Server and User are shown in Fig.3 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The proposed work has been implemented using Java with MS-Access as the backend on Windows Platform with the Hardware and Software Configurations used as follows: The Hardware configuration used in this implementation work are: The Intel Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 E7500 Processor with the operating frequency 2.93 GHz, the Main Memory used is 1.96 GB RAM with 2.93GHz frequency, and the SATA 500 GB Hard Disk Drive. The software configurations used are: 32-Bit Microsoft® Windows XP Operating System, the Java is used as Front End, and the Microsoft-Access 2007 is used as backend. Each step of the implemented result has been verified with the above said steps of authentication, and all the steps of the implemented dynamic mutual authentication scheme perform the mentioned operations effectively.
V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

A. Security Analysis
The types of security threats overcome by this dynamic mutual authentication scheme are given as follows:
1 Hash functions, 2 Encryption operations, and 2 Decryption operations, totally 22 computations. In addition to that, the proposed scheme provides Dynamic Authentication, Confidentiality, Reliability, Integrity, and Security in authentication steps. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides more security features than the other discussed authentication schemes for smart card based networks. The above table of information is shown in the Fig.4 . [24] scheme is 54968125.17(ns), the total processing time of the Fan et al. [18] Scheme is 51126444.58(ns), the total processing time of the Liaw et al. [19] Scheme is 31958284.42(ns), and the total processing time of the proposed scheme is 30819518.5(ns). From this table, it is to be noted that the Proposed Scheme processing time is comparatively much lesser than the other mentioned smart card authentication schemes. Therefore, the efficiency of this proposed scheme is much better than the other discussed authentication schemes. The above table information is shown in Fig.6 . Fig.7 shows that the proposed authentication scheme performs better than the Juang [13] Scheme by 41.153403%, 78.35491% than the Ping Wang et al. [24] Scheme, 65.88982% than the Fan et al. [18] Scheme, and 3.69495% than the Liaw et al. [19] Scheme respectively in terms of Total Processing Time. This shows that the proposed scheme consumes less processing time, when compared with the other mentioned authentication schemes. Therefore, the proposed authentication scheme performs much better than the other compared and discussed smart card authentication schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article discussed the Enhanced Dynamic Mutual Authentication Scheme with different smart card based authentication schemes. This scheme enhances the Dynamic Authentication and security features like Confidentiality, Reliability, Integrity and Security during the authentication process in Computer Network Communications using Smart Card. This authentication scheme has been implemented and each step of the implemented result has been verified with the discussed dynamic authentication steps. The security analysis shows that the proposed scheme provides more security features and overcomes all the discussed security attacks or threats because of the dynamicity in authentication steps. The performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme takes much less computation time than the other discussed smart card authentication schemes. Due to these features, the proposed scheme is a well-secured scheme for smart card based dynamic mutual authentication in computer network communications.
